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III. Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction under Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(e). 
IV. Statement of Issues Presented for Review 
Whether evidence of Mr. Martinez' prior conviction of assault by a prisoner was 
improperly admitted into evidence. 
V. Standard of Review 
Challenges to the admission of evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) is reviewed 
on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Saunders, 1999 Utah 57, at f^ 18. 
VI. Citations to Determinative Statutes 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401, 
Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other 
rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
2 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 404. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, 
evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and 
meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
VII. Statement Concerning Addendum 
The text of the relevant and determinative evidentiary rules are set forth above. 
Furthermore, there are no challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusion of law, 
memorandum decisions, oral decisions, contract or other document subject to construction 
relevant to this appeal. Other than the Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - Jury Trial which 
should be considered in its entirety 3nd which is part of the record on appeal, there are no other 
parts of the record which are of central importance in this case. As such, no addendum as 
required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(l 1) is required. 
3 
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VIII. Statement of Facts 
Mr. Martinez was charged in a one count information with the crime of assault by a 
prisoner in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5. Record, ("R'% at p. 4-5. That matter was 
tried to a jury on October 5, 2000. See, R., at 159 (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - Jury 
Trial). Having considered the evidence of the parties and following deliberation, the jury found 
Mr. Martinez guilty as charged. R., at 119. 
The State's only witness offered in support of the allegation was Daniel Terry. See., R., 
at 159 (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - Jury Trial). Terry was the alleged victim and also 
an officer at the Salt Lake County Metro Jail where the incident took place. R., 159, p. 64, 47. 
Terry testified that on June 10th, 1999. he was working as a floor officer in section 7 of the jail. 
Id., at 65. As floor officer. Terry was responsible for making sure all of the inmates in his 
section were following the rules. Id. 
According to Terry, at approximately 11:00 p.m., he and another officer started a head 
count - a procedure designed to make sure no one was missing. Id., at 65-66. During the head 
count, the officer will direct all of the inmates in a particular section to go from their cells into 
the day room. Id., at 67. Orxe all of the inmate are in the day room, the officers will conduct the 
count. Id. 
On June 10th, 1999, ^erry testified that as he started the head count he noticed that Mr. 
Martinez did not have his jumpsuit over his shoulders but instead pulled down around this waist. 
Id,, at 68, Mr. Martinez testified that he had the jump suit rolled down to his waist because the 
suit gave him a rash. IcL at 160. In fact, the Jail medical personnel gave Mr. Martinez 
permission to wear a tee shirt for that very reason. Id,, at 160. This concerned Terry because, 
4 
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"It's in the prisoners' rules and handbooks that you'll remain fully dressed at all times." Id, at 
68. Stated another way. Mr. Terry observed that Mr. Martinez was breaking one of those rules 
that Terry was charged to enforce. 
When Terry saw that Mr. Martinez did not have his jumpsuit up he ordered Mr. Martinez 
to get his jumpsuit up. Id, at at 68-69. According to Terry, Mr. Martinez merely looked at him 
and kept walking. Id. at 69. When Mr. Martinez did not immediately respond to Terry's 
command, Terry ordered Mr. Martinez to "get you jumpsuit up now." Id, at 69. At that point 
Terry testified that Mr. Martinez put his jumpsuit on as requested. Tr., at 69. 
Shortly thereafter as the inmates were making their way to the day room, Terry heard 
someone say, "fucking Elvis, fuck you."1 Id, at 71. Terry was unclear about who made the 
comment.2 Even though Terry was not sure who made the comment, he ordered Mr. Martinez 
aside to speak with him,3 Terry pulled Mr. Martinez aside because, "also in the prisoners' 
regulations and rules handbook, it -- in there that no foul and abusive language will be used and 
you will address officers and staff at the jail courteously." Id, 72-73. Once Terry had Mr. 
Martinez aside, he told him, "I don't know what you problem is. you need to follow the rules at 
1
 Elvis is Mr. Terry's nickname. Id., at 71. 
2
 Q. "Did you see who yelled those profanities?" 
A. "I didn't see - I wasn't in front of anybody that I thought yelled the 
profanities. When I - I was watching Martinez as he was walking in and his 
mouth v/as going and he had sort of turned and looked and then turned back and I 
was sort of watching the side of his face and his mouth was moving when I heard 
the profanities yelled." Id, at 70-71, 
3It is very odd that Tery could be looking at Mr. Martinez, hear the comment, see Mr. 
Martinez mouth move all while standing only twelve feet away and still not be sure who made 
the comment, assuming the comment was made at all. 
5 
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all times. I'm not the officer not to be following the rules with, 'cause I go by the book . . . . " At 
that point, according to Terry, Mr. Martinez stood up. Id, at 75. Terry then put his hand up and 
directed Mr. Martinez to sit down. Id, at 75. Terry testified that Mr. Martinez then grabbed 
Terry by the shirt. Id. Thereafter, a scuffle ensued during which time Mr. Martinez attempted to 
strike Terry. Ultimately. Terry was able to subdue Mr. Martinez. Id, at 76-81. Based on the 
forgoing evidence, the State rested. 
In response to the State's evidence, Mr. Martinez called three witnesses. The first witness 
for the defense was Michael Toledo. Mr. Toledo was an inmate in Metro Jail on the evening of 
the alleged assault. Id, at 128. According to Mr. Toledo, he was playing cards with Mr. 
Martinez just before Terry called for the head count. Id, at 129. When the count was called Mr. 
Toledo and Mr. Martinez began to move from their cell to the day room. Id, at 131-32. As Mr. 
Toledo and Mr. Martinez were moving toward the day room Mr. Toledo testified that he heard 
Terry order Mr. Martinez to pull up his jumpsuit. Id, at 132. At that point it appeared that Terry 
was upset with Mr. Martinez because he was not walking fast enough and because he did not 
immediately pull up his jumpsuit. Id, at 132-33. Mr. Toledo heard Terry curse at Mr. Martinez 
and order him to get his suit up. Id., at 133. In response, Mr. Toledo heard Mr. Martinez tell 
Terry that he had clearance to wear his jumpsuit in that fashion. Id, at 137. Terry then grabbed 
Mr. Martinez by the arm and lead him into the hallway wear the scuffle occurred. 
Mr. Toledo described that Terry lead Mr. Martinez by the arm into a hallway which is 
separated from the common area by a door. Id, at 134. The door has a big window through 
which one could see the hallway. Id, at 134. Immediately after Terry took Mr. Martinez into the 
hallway, Mr. Toledo took a spot by the door so he could see what was happening. Id, at 135. As 
6 
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Mr. Toledo looked through the window he watched as Terry yelled at Mr. Martinez. Terry then 
grabbed Mr. Martinez by the back of the neck and pushed his face into a blue seat. Id, at 135. 
Terry then pushed Mr. Martinez into the wall. Id, at 136. About that time several other officers 
arrived to offer assistance. According to Mr. Toledo, Mr. Martinez never grabbed Terry and 
never took a swing at him. Id, 
Finally, Mr. Martinez testified in his own defense. Mr. Martinez testified that he is 
seventeen years old, is approximately 5f 8" and that he weighs 130 pounds. Id., at 158. This 
testimony was presumably offered in contrast Terry's build which he described as 5' 11" at 190 
pounds. Id., at 86. Mr. Martinez confirmed that he was in Metro Jail on the night of the 
occurrence, that at approximately 11:00 p.m. he was called out for head count, and that left his 
cell with his jumpsuit around his waist. Id,, at 158 - 60. When Mr. Martinez moved from the 
cell toward the day room he stated that Terry told him to, "Roll up your fucking jumpsuit." Id,, 
at 161. Mr. Martinez did not immediately respond because he was somewhat taken back by the 
aggressive command. Id, at 161. Instead, Mr. Martinez just looked at Terry who again ordered 
that Mr. Martinez pull up his jumpsuit. Id, Following the second instruction Mr. Martinez 
pulled up his jumpsuit as he headed toward the day room. Id
 k 
When Mr. Martinez was just inside the day room door, Terry instructed him to come out 
into the hall with him. Id, at 162. Consistent with Mr. Toledo's testimony, Mr. Martinez denied 
every cursing at Terry. Id, Nonetheless, Terry physically escorted Mr. Martinez into the hallway. 
Id., at 163. When Mr. Martinez was in the hallway the door between the hallway and the 
common area closed behind him and he sat down on the bench. Id, As Mr. Martinez sat on the 
bench Terry leaned down about a foot away from Mr. Martinez' face and asked if Mr. Martinez 
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wanted a piece of him. Id, at 164. Mr. Martinez responded, "'what the hell did I do?" Id, at 
165. Terry again posed the same question to Mr. Martinez to which Mr. Martinez gave the same 
answer. Id With this second exchange Mr. Martinez began to feel uncomfortable and tried to 
scoot down the bench away from Terry. Id., at 165 - 66. As Mr. Martinez started to move away 
from Terry, Terry stood up and started coming toward Mr. Martinez. At this point Mr. Martinez 
also stood up and took a step back from Terry. Id, at 167. Terry then grabbed Mr. Martinez by 
both shoulders, ordered him to sit down and then physically pushed him into a seated position on 
the bench. Id, at 168. Mr. Martinez responded by telling Terry to, "keep his fucking hands off 
[him]. Id. This apparently further upset Terry who then struck Mr. Martinez in the nose. Id, at 
169. After Terry hit Mr. Martinez, Mr. Martinez tried to get up off the bench and get away from 
Terry. Id, at 170. Terry and Mr. Martinez then wrestled around until Terry was able to handcuff 
) 
and subdue Mr. Martinez. Id, at 117 - 73. Mr. Martinez testified that he did not grab Terrysshirt 
and that he did not take a swing at him. Id, at 174. 
On cross examination, the third question the State posed to Mr. Martinez was, "Now, 
you're in jail because of being convicted of a crime; is that right?" Id, at 175. Following the 
affirmative response, the State asked, "In fact, you've been convicted - " at which point defense 
counsel asked to approach the bench. Id, at 176. Following an off the record discussion, the 
following exchange took place: 
Q. "So, you're in jail for a conviction of a crime of assault by a prisoner, are you 
not." 
A. Yes. I am. 
Q. So, you beat someone up, in a correctional facility; is that right? 
8 
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-
Id, at 176. 
The State then closed its examination of Mr. Martinez with the following series of 
questions: 
Q. That's what it seems like. You're just an innocent victim? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. An innocent victim with a prior felony conviction; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. An innocent victim with a prior felony conviction for assault by a prisoner; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
14, at 179. 
Following the presentation of the defense, Mr. Martinez offered into evidence Defense 
Exhibit 2 by stipulation. Id., at 181. Defense Exhibit 2 is the medical evaluation form which 
demonstrating the injuries Mr. Martinez suffered in the incident which include, a laceration on 
Mr. Martinez nose, three contusions on his forehead, multiple contusions on the chest, contusions 
on the shoulder and arm, and swelling of Mr. Martinez' right wrist. Defendant's Exhibit 2. 
During its closing argument, the State relied on the evidence it elicited concerning Mr. 
Martinez prior conviction stating, "'You heard the defendant admit he's also a convicted felon, 
assault by a prisoner. He's predisposed to commit these crimes - " Id, at 211. Trial counsel 
objected to the statement arguing that the evidence of the prior conviction could only be used as 
impeachment evidence and not substantively. Id., at 211. Although the judge sustained the 
9 
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objection he did not give a limiting instruction to the jury. Id, at 211. 
Following the presentation of the case, the jury took the matter under advisement and, 
thereafter, returned a verdict of guilty. R., at 119. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
During the trial of this matter the State offered and the trail court received evidence 
concerning the fact that the defendant previously committed the crime of assault by a prisoner. 
The trial court erred in accepting this evidence because 1) the evidence was offered to prove 
nothing other than the fact that Mr. Martinez has a propensity to commit crime in violation of 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), 2) the evidence did not go to any fact which was of consequence 
and, therefore was not relevant pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 402, and 3) the probative 
value of the evidence was vastly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in violation of 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Although the admission of the prior conviction may not have been 
sufficiently documented in the record, the issue is properly before the court due to the obvious 
nature of the error or, in the alternative, the ineffective assistance of counsel for not preserving 
the record. As a result of the foregoing errors, Mr. Martinez right to a fair trial and to the due 
process of law were infringed. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
Mr. MartinezVonstitutionally protected right to the due process of law was infringed by 
the admission of evidence concerning a prior conviction of assault by a prisoner. Every 
defendant is vested with the Constitutionally protected right to require the State to prove each 
element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Saunders, 1999 Utah 59, at 1j 15, that right can be 
10 
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jeopardized by the admission of prior bad acts because such evidence "may have such a powerful 
tendency to mislead the finder of fact as to subvert the constitutional principle that a defendant 
may be convicted only if guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific crime charged." Thus it 
has become "fundamental in our law that a person may be convicted criminally only for his acts, 
not for his general character. That principle is violated if a conviction is based on an inference 
that conviction is justified because of the defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit 
bad acts." kL 
The rule excluding admission of prior crimes is governed by Utah Rule of Evidence 
404(b) which provides, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under 
this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of 
Rules 402 and 403." 
The Utah Supreme Court recently defined the proper analysis which must be used to 
determine what evidence is and is not admissible under 404(b). See. State v. Decorso. 1999 Utah 
57. In Decorso, the Court held that in order to admit evidence of a prior crime the trial court 
must conduct a three part test. Decorso. at f^ 20. First, the court must determine whether the 
evidence is being offered for a proper non-character purpose. If the court determines that the 
evidence of the prior crime is being offered only to show the defendant's propensity to commit 
crime, then the analysis stops and the evidence must be excluded. If the court finds that the 
proposed evidence is being offered for a proper non-character purpose it must then make a 
11 
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determination concerning whether the proposed evidence is relevant under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 402. Under Rule 402, as further clarified by Rule 401, only evidence which has a 
tendency to make material fact more or less probable shall be admissible. Only if the court finds 
that the proposed evidence of the prior crime is relevant can it move the final step in the analysis 
which is to determine whether the existence of the crime at issue meets the requirements of Rule 
403. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, although relevant, evidence that has a probative value 
that is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice must be excluded. Applying 
the foregoing analysis to the fact of this case shows that the trial court erred in admitting the 
evidence concerning Mr. Martinez'prior conviction. 
A. The Evidence of Mr. Martinez Prior Conviction Should Have Been Excluded 
Under Rules of Evidence 404(b). 402 and 403. 
The evidence of Mr. Martinez* prior conviction of assault by a prisoner should have been 
excluded because it fails each of the three Decorso tests. First, as evidenced by the record, the 
only reason the State offered evidence of Mr. Martinez prior conviction was to prove his 
propensity to commit assault. Second, even if there was some proper purpose for offering the 
evidence it is simply not relevant to any of the essential elements of the crime charged. Finally, 
under any analysis the non-existent probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect. 
1. Mr. Martinez Prior Conviction Should Have Been Excluded Under 404(b). 
Evidence of Mr. Martinez' prior conviction should have been excluded because it was 
offered for an improper purpose. The plain language of Rule 404(b) specifically excludes 
evidence that is offered to prove the defendant's propensity to commit crime. See also, Decorso, 
12 
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at H 21. What is patently clear from the record is that the State offered the evidence of the prior 
conviction for precisely for that reason. Indeed, during the State's closing argument that is 
exactly what it told the jury. Specifically, ihe State argued, "You heard the defendant admit he's 
also a convicted felon, assault by a prisoner. He*:; predisposed to commit these crimes - " R, at 
159 (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings - Juiy Trial) p. 2 ! ) . As is evidenced by the State's 
own argument, it is clear that the evidence of Mr. Martinez prior conviction was offered for the 
sole reason of proving that "He's predisposed to commit these crimes." Given that the evidence 
was offered for an improper purpose it should never have been allowed into evidence. 
Going beyond the fact that the State offered the evidence for an improper purpose, 
arguing that Mr. Martinez" is predisposed to commit "these crimes" is, in and of itself, is grounds 
to reverse the conviction Indeed, the Saunders Court expressly held, 
Anchoring the principle that prior crime evidence is not admissible to show 
criminal propensity is the more fundamental principle that a prosecutor may never 
argue ov suggest to the finder of fact, either directly or indirectly, that a defendant 
should be convicted oecause of bis criminal character or thai he was guilty of the 
crime charged because he acted in accord with a criminal propensity shown by 
such evidence. This i:s true regardless of whether that evidence was properly or 
erroneously admitted. A prosecutor who intentionally calls to jurors' attention 
matters ::hai ihey sho'aid cot consider in reaching a verdict is clearly guilty of 
misconduct, particularly when a prosecutor argues prior bad acts or prior criminal 
conduct as a basis for corndenn^.. 
State v. Sauders. at % 35 <eTnn St,ate.v,_Sn?iiiett, ?39 ?.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Tarafa, 720 P.2d 136-?, i 371' -"3 (Utah 1986)), Sa_niders provides clear and black letter law 
requiring that this case be re v^-sed. 
Additionally, J:iere is no iegssmate reason available to show Mr. Martinez' prior 
conviction was offered fc: any ncn.-character purpose. Utah Rale o\ Evidence 404(b) allows for 
13 
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the admission of prior crimes to order to prove, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absent of mistake or accident. Clearly, none of those reasons exist in this 
case. There is no dispute in this case that there was a scuffle between Mr. Martinez and Terry at 
the Metro Jail. Therefore, opportunity and identity are not at issue. See, State v. Johnson, 748 
P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987)(Defendant put identity at issue by arguing he was not the one who forged 
the check at issue.) Similarly, as Mr. Martinez denied every having assaulted or attempting to 
assault Terry, knowledge and intent are not available to admit the prior crime. See, State v. 
Brown, 577 P.2d 135 (Utah 1978)(Defendant put knowledge and intent at issue by claiming that 
he was innocently caught up in his son's criminal activity); State v. Ramirez, 942 P.2d 366 (Utah 
App 1996)(Defendant put intent at issue by defending on the ground that was innocently 
involved in drug activity.) Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest Mr. Martinez left his cell 
with an organized plan to assault Terry. As such, preparation and plan are not available to admit 
Mr. Martinez prior conviction. Finally, nothing about the prior crime speaks to the issue of 
motive. The evidence of Mr. Martinez' prior conviction was offered for the State's express 
purpose which was to prove Mr. Martinez has a propensity to commit crimes. As such, it is 
patently inadmissible and should have been excluded. 
2. Mr. Martinez' Prior Conviction Should Have Been Excluded Under 402. 
In addition to being inadmissible under 404(b), Mr. Martinez prior conviction is also 
inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence Rule 402. Rule 402 exclude all evidence that is not 
relevant. What constitutes relevant evidence is defined by Rule 401 which provides, "'Relevant 
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact which is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would to be 
14 
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without the evidence." In this case, Mr. Martinez was charged with assault by a prisoner in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5. Because Mr. Martinez' prior conviction does not 
tend to prove or disprove any of the essential element of the crime of assault by a prisoner it is 
irrelevant and should have been excluded. 
The only facts that are relevant at trial to prove that Mr. Martinez committed the crime of 
assault by a prisoner are; 1) whether Mr. Martinez committed an assault, 2) with the intent to 
cause bodily injury, 3) while he was a prisoner. State v. Duran, 733 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 
1989)(citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5). In support of the charge, the State argued below 
that Mr. Martinez grabbed Terry and took a swing at him. In defense of the charge, Mr. Martinez 
argued that he did not grab or try to hit Terry. Thus, in this case the only facts which are of 
consequence are whether or not Mr. Martinez grabbed or attempted hit Terry. As Mr. Martinez 
prior conviction has not bearing on that issue, other than to prove is propensity to commit crime, 
it is irrelevant and should have been excluded on that basis. 
3. Mr. Martinez' Prior Conviction Should Have Been Excluded Under 403. 
Finally, the evidence of Mr. Martinez prior conviction should have been excluded under 
Rule 403 because its limited, if not non-existent, probative value is substantially outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . .." Utah Rule of Evidence 403; See 
also, State v. Decorso. (Utah 1999). "Under a Rule 403 analysis, the trial court may find 
evidence to be unfairly prejudicial, and therefore inadmissible, if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, arouses a sense of horror, provokes the instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause the 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case." State 
v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1996)(citing Carter v. Hewitt. 617 F.2d 961, 972-73 (3d 
Cir.1980) (citation omitted); State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989)(internal quotations 
omitted). As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Saunders, evidence of a prior crime has a 
powerful tendency to move the jury to convict on grounds other than those which are issue in the 
case. State v. Saunders, 1999 Utah 59, at ^ 15.'"[I]n reaching a decision whether to exclude 
[evidence] on the grounds of unfair prejudice,'" the trial court may also consider " 4[t]he 
availability of other means of proof [as] an appropriate factor.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
475 (Utah 1988) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 403 advisory committee's note). 
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the fact of this case it is evident that the 
minimal probative value of the prior conviction is far outweighed by the harmful and prejudicial 
effects of its admission. As noted above, there is little if anything that the prior conviction adds 
to proving that Mr. Martinez committed the crime of assault by a prisoner. Indeed, the only 
reason it was offered seems to be to prove that Mr. Martinez has a propensity to commit "crimes 
like these." As such, the evidence can do nothing other than inflame the jury and lead them to 
conclude that Mr. Martinez is a hardened criminal who guilt is evident by his combative nature. 
Because it is precisely that type of evidence that Rule 403 is designed to prevent and because 
there is no probative value associate with the prior conviction, that evidence should have been 
excluded under Rule 403. 
In this case, the admission of evidence of Mr. Martinez' prior conviction was improper 
because it was offered for an improper purpose, it was irrelevant to any fact which was of 
consequence to the proceedings and because its probative value was substantially outweighed by 
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the danger of unfair prejudice. 
B. The Evidence of Mr. Martinez Prior Conviction Constitutes Plain Error Or, In 
The Alternative, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
As noted above, the evidence of Mr. Martinez prior conviction was erroneous. However, 
from the record it is unclear whether trial counsel properly documented the objection in the 
record. See, State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998). Even so, the clearly erroneous 
error, or in the alternative, the ineffective assistance which stems from failing to preserve the 
issue for appeal, places this issue properly before this Court. 
L The Admission of Mr. Martinez' Prior Conviction Constitutes Plain Error. 
"In general, to establish plain error, the appellant must show the following: "(i) An error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). As noted above, the trial court erred in 
admitting the evidence of Mr. Martinez prior conviction. Moreover, that error should have been 
obvious. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Saunders, "the law has long prohibited the 
admission of prior crime evidence unless such evidence is probative of an issue other than 
criminal propensity or character and is not unduly prejudicial. The rule limiting the admissibility 
of evidence of prior crimes, as presently stated in rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, has 
existed for almost a century in this state." Given that the prior convictions cannot be admitted to 
prove criminal propensity, that this rule is expressly set forth in Rule 404(b) and that this rule has 
existed in this state for "almost a century" it should have been obvious that it was improper to 
admit the evidence. Finally, the error was harmful because it opened the door for the State to 
argue that Mr. Martinez has a propensity to commit "these crimes." The obvious nature of the 
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error below is sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 
2. Trial Counsel's Failure To Object To The Admission Of The Prior 
Conviction Constitutes Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel. 
To bring a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "a defendant must show that 
trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it 'fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. 
Garrett 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In determining whether counsel's 
performance was deficient, "we must 'indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'"" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 
(citation omitted)); accord State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 46L 465 (Utah App. 1993). To establish 
prejudice under Strickland, the defendant must show that, "but for the deficient representation, 
there is a 'reasonable probability' that the result would have been different." State v. Hall, 946 
P.2d 712, 719 (Utah App.1997) (citation omitted), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). 
Prejudice will not be presumed, see Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522-23 (Utah 1994), and if 
the defendant fails to establish prejudice, "we need not determine whether counsel's performance 
was [in fact] deficient," State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Under the first prong of the Strickland test there can be little doubt trial counsel's failure 
to object to the admission of the prior conviction was deficient. Although counsel is granted a 
broad range of discretion in formulating trial strategy, there is simply no benefit or advantage to 
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Under the iirs prong of the Strickland test there can be little doubt trial counsel's failure 
to object to the admission of the prior conviction was deficient. Although counsel is granted a 
broad range of discretion in ferrnuiahng trial strategy, there is simply no benefit or advantage to 
be gained by admitting z\ i::bnce of a prior crime. Indeed, such evidence can only serve to harm 
the defendant. Speaking generally, o: ^ ithhi the factual context of this case, no sound trial 
strategy would permit allowing evidence of a prior crime to be admitting into evidence. 
Under the second prong of the Strickland rejl it is equally clear that allowing the evidence 
of the prior assault conviction prejudiced Mr. Martinez. Without the evidence of Mr. Martinez' 
prior conviction the evide :\: n vhich \^s presented shcv/ing Teny as a jail guard who is almost 
obsessive about making stirt hitn^cs fel-o^ the rules. According to Terry, Mr. Martinez broke 
the "rules*' by having hhj j v ^ s u U cov/r* ?:• /o'nd hn vyarte and :ben, v.hen confronted, told Terry, 
"Fucking Elvis. F : :k Y*-\T Then. the jury hn;1 t::•.-: evidence vhat this !7 year old minor 
weighing 130 pounds <J ;;d landing .v; 5' T tail. aU.nn.ed Terry who is a jail guard weighing 190 
pounds and standing r5' i • . FinaHy, tb'-* jury had lh^ medical report documenting the substantial 
physical injury Mr. Martinen suffered in the alternation which was inconsistent with the 
testimony offered by Terry. hbvveven with the evidence nf the prior crime the dynamics of the 
evidence change substantially Nov.-. the h,ry has before it evidence that Mr. Martinez has a 
violent disposition and no notation to commit violent crimes even while incarcerated. This, 
coupled with the State's crgjnvnvt that Mr, Martinez is predisposed to commit assault, was 
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the jury's t;erchct. 
In sum, whether tin ::rjor er -me vn taker. mtn evidence as ?. result of plain and obvious 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
error from the bench or whether the error rests exclusively with trial counsel, Mr. Martinez was 
prejudiced by the admission of his prior conviction. 
X. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully request the Court reverse the judgment 
below and remand this case for further proceedings. 
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